

Hadow read a paper prepared by the Foreign Office on Soviet intentions in Cuba. He asked that this not be referred to as a British Government view.

One reason for the Soviet intervention was that Khrushchev saw the need, under heavy pressure from his defense chiefs, to take a strong part in the nuclear balance, which the Soviet Union recognises is in favour of the United States. As a politician Khrushchev probably also saw the need to apply leverage for settlement of Berlin on terms that would enable him to carry out his claims. This is important in the Soviet stand towards China.

The development of bases in Cuba was seen as the method to do this. It would also enable Khrushchev to have a knave-deus ex machina to be used in connection with his visit to the United Nations. The Ukrainian peasant side of Khrushchev may have realised that this was a rather risky business. Perhaps he even opposed it at first. His initial basic miscalculation was to let himself be persuaded.

The Foreign Office thinks that the military persuaded Khrushchev the vital stage was the landing of the equipment. After that the build-up could go on with impunity, covered by explanations that the whole thing was only defensive.

Khrushchev also miscalculated in thinking that intermediate range missiles would not be discovered by the United States -- or that if they were discovered the United States would take no particular violent action, but would go to the U.N. (Khrushchev apparently gambled that in the U.N. he could appeal for the support of the neutrals and uncommitted countries in bringing down any aggressive action).

For weeks after there were no talks from the time of the Paul Castro visit to Moscow in July. All the time the rumors seem to have been out of control since then. The last statement of Khrushchev likely to be regarded as defining the limits of the and partly to show the United States against any attempt to interfere with shipping.

Khrushchev and the Russians seemed to think that the plan was working remarkably well. They were made doubly sure, they sent messages to the United States with a solid assurance.

Then came the final U.N. intervention that the weapons were offensive. Until the visit of Kennedy to Kennedy, the Russians may have thought that they could get away with the news. Kennedy in leading the way on and not condemning him with the evidence and action against the U.S. Khrushchev's responsibility (which is interesting).

In any event the Kennedy announcement of the blockade caught the Soviet Union completely off balance. It is highly significant that the Russian statements immediately showed up caution. This was on April, a word of American determination to see that

and down.

Wasn't he doing it? Khrushchev's latest talking about Turkish missiles in Turkey was a bluff as if the tough people in the Kremlin were going to give to the Americans for nothing instead of a price tag. Now the line reverted to normal. Khrushchev's bluff didn't last the effort but was forced into ~~normalcy~~, but it was a dangerous step. It could have led the United States to conclude that the Russians were now offering to new terms in West Berlin. When the United States said that the cases were as complicated first (and made known clear what it was prepared to back the cases), the situation became much worse for the Russians. This surprised Khrushchev with the possibility of having ~~shown~~ out his intention to bomb the United States again, and this he certainly would not do. Hence he cut his losses.

Although the Turkish deal was dropped, there is an oblique allusion to it in the proposal of some sort of agreement between NATO and the Warsaw pact.

It is significant that since the Cuban crisis there has been no Russian statement on Berlin. There is no indication that the Russians mean to move there soon.

We should not assume that Khrushchev has had an easy time in the Presidency. Undoubtedly there was some tension and there are bitter recriminations. Evidently Khrushchev ~~was~~ is still in control, and there is no evidence of an anti-Khrushchev movement. But undoubtedly Khrushchev will be very careful in watching the internal situation.

The London Office does not expect a violent Soviet reaction. Rather, it expects a prolonged period of wound-licking, and painful post-mortems.

Who are the "tough" people in the Kremlin? Britain doesn't know for sure. But there is a faintly Chinese-Stalin wing left, and Malinovsky (Minister of Defense) may be one of the tough ones.

Is there much pressure to make Khrushchev save face? This is always a false premise, and we would be foolish to think about it. The Communists always have lines of retreat.

Why does the Foreign Office think that after the U-2 incident, the Russians discounted American aerial surveillance? Even with the ability of aerial photography, it is not always sure. It did not directly establish the fact of offensive bases until three days before the blockade. The Russians might have gotten away with it. They might have concluded that the U.S. would not do anything before Khrushchev arrived in the United States.